The implications of such a political confrontation are four-fold. Firstly, for the first time Hezbollah is obliged to face a clear no-go barrier imposed by the government, its political opponent, disallowing it from continuing its enjoyed liberties as a “state within a state,” a freedom it has taken for granted since its inception in 1982, but particularly since the Israeli pull-out from South Lebanon in 2000. Secondly, also for the first time, the government is questioning the legitimacy of Hezbollah’s role as a resistance movement. The decrees directly and indirectly state that although the “state within a state” freedoms have been exercised in South Lebanon, propagating them to Beirut, the Lebanese capital falls outside Hezbollah’s claimed mandate as a resistance movement. The decrees also directly classify the telecommunication network as unsubstantiated for resistance purposes, despite the fact that Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah explicitly specified this in his May 8th speech as the sole role of the network, claiming it was key to guaranteeing a top-of-the-line “command and control” amongst Hezbollah’s leadership and fighters during the July 2006 War . Thirdly, the issuance of the decrees for the first time impedes upon the independent internal control Hezbollah has over its organization. One of the unique characteristics of Hezbollah’s organization model is the blurred line between member and supporter. Hence, although Shqeir is not an actual member of Hezbollah, his ousting was still considered to be a violating offence. Lastly, the above-three implications contain political ripple effects that allow the government to bring back to the table the necessary discussion over Hezbollah’s weapons. This came at a time when United Nation’s Ban Ki-Moon was preparing to issue a progress report on UNSCR 1559, calling for the disarmament of all groups in Lebanon. The siege of Beirut and the mountains, which has led to 65 people killed and over 200 wounded, has further validated the necessity for such a discussion.

Act I: West and East once again?

During the Lebanese Civil War of 1975-1990, west Beirut was reserved for Lebanese Muslims and the east for its Christians. The past week of events has obliged many to bring back to the public mind these old labels that smell of the blood of 150,000 dead Lebanese and Palestinians. One journalist even said it was time to revert to their even more official names, West Beirut and East Beirut, and yes, please note the W on “West” and E on “East” as Mr. Fisk would say(1). But the parallel is frightfully deceiving, for today’s Lebanese battleground is not about Christians versus Muslims, but rather a sectarian outpouring of hatred between Sunnis and Shi’ites, an odious stench that easily transcends the porous borders of the Lebanese state.

The first days into the crisis, the guns of Hezbollah and its allies penetrated the capital in open-heart surgery without any aesthesia. And while East Beirut remained relatively safe, with the exception of destruction in its Sunni quarters, West Beirut became infested and its buildings were gunned, its roads blocked, and its citizens humiliated by their exposed vulnerability. The defence strategy of the people: scream and cry and huddle in their corridors, away from the windows of their homes. Today, the army has established control over the streets of Beirut. But no one wants to travel Fouad Shehab highway to get to the other side of town. Tanks remain in an attempt to re-stitch the re-opened wound, but the roads are to be avoided.

The consequences of these actions on Hezbollah are devastating. Aside from Hezbollah, March 8 was also composed of the Shi’ite Amal Movement; key anti-government Sunni politicians, many of whom are former prime ministers; a debatable half of the Christian population represented by the Free Patriotic Movement, the Marada party, and the Armenian party, Tashnag; the Druze Lebanese Democratic Party; the Syrian Social Nationalist Party; and Lebanon’s Communist Party. Hezbollah’s attacks against Beirut’s Sunni neighbourhoods prompted anuproar of disapproval from March 8th’s major Sunni players, particularly former Prime Ministers Omar Karami, Selim al-Hoss, and the more moderate Najib Mikati. All three expressed clear disapproval of Hezbollah’s actions and went as far as to pronounce support for the government’s efforts in ending the crisis. Hezbollah’s bombardment of Druze villages and towns with RPGs and arbitrary machine gun fire further prompted action within the Lebanese Democratic Party, which ended up cooperating with its direct political opponent, March 14 Druze leader Walid Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party, to disarm civilians in the Druze villages and allow the Lebanese Army to safely enter and reassert control. Although the Druze retain their loyalty to March 8 and Hezbollah’s resistance nature despite the tragic loss of Druze lives, March 8 has lost its small Sunni representation that had allowed the opposition bloc to easily claim credibility due to its trans-sectarian membership.

Act II: Irony on Christian ground

Caught within the Shi’ite-Sunni confrontation are the Christians, almost equally split between the fierce supporters of the government, and the legitimizers of Hezbollah. The former is led by Samir Geagea, an outspoken leader in the March 14 movement. The latter, however, is of more interest for the purposes of this article. Returning from a pleasant exiled life in Paris, General Michel Aoun, leader of the Freedom Patriotic Movement, had initially joined the chorus that ousted Syria’s troops from Lebanese soil. A year later, he signed the infamous Memorandum of Understanding with Hezbollah. It must be made explicitly clear that the current crisis would have never happened if Mr. Aoun had not presented Hezbollah General Secretary Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah with the key to the movement’s ability to become a legitimate national player: Christian support. Exaggerated allegiance to Hezbollah’s resistance ideology and undying support and protection of the group’s weapons has allowed Hezbollah in its 16 years of existence to realistically contemplate the establishment of the wilayat al-faqih Although 29 years after the Iranian Islamic Revolution, it is never too late to confirm the exportation of international Shi’ite revolution.

Act III: The Israeli green light, extended

In his ferocious May 8 speech, Nasrallah accused March 14 Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and the Seniora government of preparing for the takeover of Lebanon by the CIA and Mosaad. And yet, speaking on Army Radio, ex-IDF Chief of Staff Amnon Lipkin-Shahak did not hesitate to say, “If an armed conflict erupts, it will be simpler to strike Lebanon when Hezbollah is the legitimate ruler.” Such a statement raises questions regarding the credibility of Nasrallah’s accusations against the Seniora government and its allegedly “friendly views” of Israel. Waiting for the right time to pounce, the Israeli government is closely watching the situation in Beirut and the mountains. With little confidence in the government to manage the security situation and the pause in peace talks with Syria, it will not be long before the Israeli state takes matters into its own hands.

Act IV: In the footsteps of Hamas

Paralleling Hamas, Hezbollah is sending signals that it wishes to shift from the position of opposition to ruler, as was done by the Palestinian group with the takeover of Gaza. The current crisis shows the Lebanese the ease with which Hezbollah could take over not only Beirut, but the neighboring mountains as well. And yet, a takeover of the country’s national institutions would end Hezbollah’s long-time shield as an opposition party. They will have to assume national responsibility for their actions and the passivity of the army that watched but did not budge. The creation of the wilayat al-faqih would lead to the termination of Hezbollah as resistance. But, it will give them the opportunity to legitimize their arms. With a weak army and no support from the Arab League, the wilayat al-faqih’s government would have to protect itself. The unfortunate catch-22 is clear: although the establishment of such a state would mean an end to the movement’s credibility as Arab resistance, it will mark the beginning of a new credibility of the maintenance of its arms. And like any state, it will have diplomatic relations with other governments, namely Syria and Iran.  

Act V: Forecasted defeat in Dahiyeh

On May 14, an Arab Delegation from the Arab League entered Beirut through Rafiq al-Hariri International Airport and held a series of talks with members of Hezbollah and March 8 and the Seniora government. It was decided that talks would be held in Doha, Qatar where the two parties would come together and outline an agreement that would re-align the balance of power within the country. In the meantime, both parties were required to make concessions, starting with the government. On May 15, the Seniora government announced that it was renouncing the two decrees that had so valuably questioned the legitimacy of Hezbollah. In return, Amal leader and Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri promised to re-open the airport and its main highway and put an end to civil disobedience. The sacrifices for the government are immense. Once again characterized as diplomatic, the government has come to face the fact that it is not in a position to guarantee national security. Disappointingly, the Lebanese Army is much to blame for the government’s political retreat. Throughout the battles, the Lebanese Army, headed by presidential consensus candidate General Michel Sleiman, failed to control the security situation on the ground and their passivity allowed Hezbollah to continue its terrorizing campaign. This has discredited Sleiman’s ability to act as president simply because he is incapable of challenging Hezbollah and will therefore not be able to stop the continued flow of arms to the movement, or the movement’s ever-developing technological infrastructure.

For March 8, the sacrifices are less obvious. One interpretation is that Hezbollah has won the battle against the Lebanese government, and that next time, it will win the war. Another interpretation is that Hezbollah will not feel the consequences of its actions until later on when it tries to wage war again and is faced with no support. Throughout the crisis, Hezbollah’s political statements and actions were characterized by a growing impatience towards the Lebanese government and frustration over Hezbollah’s inability to participate in Lebanon’s key political institution since its ministers resigned in December 2006. For the first time, Hezbollah chose not to deny allegations but to justify their actions instead. In the past, allegations regarding the smuggling of arms to Hezbollah were met with blunt denial from Hezbollah’s leadership. Today, Hezbollah did not deny that Shqeir was a loyal supporter of Hezbollah, or that the telecommunication network was theirs. Instead, they confirmed Shqeir was amongst their brethren and that the network existed even longer than was assumed, all under the justification of developing the resistance. Hezbollah has therefore shifted from avoiding the spotlight on controversial issues to shedding the light directly on them. This loss in subtlety will hurt Hezbollah in the long-run as it realizes that fewer people will be willing to trust its incentives and even fewer will be able to tolerate its actions.

Finale: Celebrations in Tehran

It is important to recognize the role of Iran in the workings of Hezbollah. Iran is an essential player, not only because 1500 of its Revolutionary Guards founded Hezbollah in 1982, or that it is the main provider of the movement’s weapons, but because it is in Iran that the concept of wilayat al-faqih was born. But the Beirut battleground cannot be analyzed only as an arena where proxy players come to play. The same way it is not enough to assume that the actions of the Seniora government are determined by the US, it is inaccurate to assume that the actions of Hezbollah are dictated by Iran. The will of a Lebanese wilayat al-faqih does not come from Tehran. Whereas both the Iranian and Lebanese models are meant to act as buffers against growing American involvement in the Middle East, the impetus for the creation of such a state in Lebanon is to serve as a platform for the destruction of Israel.

As the Doha talks will prepare the ground for Sleiman to be elected president of Lebanon after a 5-month presidential vacuum, the Lebanese Army will become the sole institution accountable for the country’s national security. Under Sleiman, the questions the revoked decrees presented will emerge again, and Hezbollah will have to carefully consider how to handle the situation when the time comes. If it opts to attack the government (i.e. army) as it chose to do last week, Hezbollah will confirm that they are not locked in a March 14-March 8 battle, but have broader motives, mainly the creation of the wilayat al-faqih. The trace of legitimacy that it retains from its Christian supporters will be lost in such an attack of the army on the country’s only “neutral” institution.

The question, however, is whether or not Hezbollah is ready to pay the high price for such a transformation from opposition to ruler. In this wilayat al-faqih, there will be no space for Lebanon’s Christians (with the exception of Mr. Aoun who would assume the state’s presidency). There will also be no space for its Sunnis. With no access to Nasrallah’s cards, it is difficult to assess the strength of his position. Even in 2006, following the Israeli retaliation to Hezbollah’s kidnappings, the question of the wilayat al-faqih was still fast asleep, although it had been rocked by 34 days of bombings. However, having turned its weapons against the Lebanese, the movement has brought back the possibility of realizing its dream, its incentive to come into existence in 1982. In a series of acts, the Lebanese story continues to unfold. It is still to be seen whether Nasrallah will want to claim full authorship rights over its pages.

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