In the wake of recent talks between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority (PA) in Annapolis, MD, the spirit of the times seems to be pointing towards the immanent creation of a Palestinian state. It marked, for the first time, the international community’s convening of a conference explicitly designed to create the framework for a state and, more importantly, the Bush Administration’s first serious foray into the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert used strong rhetoric, calling the situation in lieu of a two-state solution an “apartheid-like struggle”, which would previously have been unthinkable without political suicide by Israeli politicians. President Mahmoud Abbas has begun a worldwide tour to gain money to support democratic institutions and is confident that a state will become a reality before January 2009. The idea of a Palestinian state has shifted from a question of “if it will exist” to “when it will exist.”

 

The difference between rhetoric and reality is, however, the difference between black and white. The end of talks has seen no substantial change in the status quo policies in Gaza and the West Bank. Israel still maintains roadblocks and checkpoints, which, in addition to constricting free movement, give Israel functional control over the territories’ economy because they regulate the flow of goods and market exchanges. The fundraising by the PA, then, will be indirectly controlled by Israel. Military incursions by the IDF, especially within Gaza, have become “routine” and persist concomitant to post-Annapolis talks. There are even hot disagreements on the process of the talks. The Palestinian delegation insists that the starting-point of negotiation should be the last-ditch effort at peace made at the 2001 talks in Taba, Egypt. Israel contends, however, that since there was no written accord during those talks, it would be insufficient to follow them and instead proposes that the talks start from scratch. However, the biggest blow for the prospects of peace has been the recent announcement of housing expansion in the Har Homa neighborhood of East Jerusalem. There is now a gloomy pall over the Annapolis process as the public in both Israel and the Palestinian territories is pessimistic about the prospects for success.    

These actions have led the Palestinian delegation to become increasingly disillusioned by the process. For example, Ahmad Quray, the head of the Palestinian negotiation for final-status talks, has recently condemned those talks as useless in light of Israel’s continued policies. Hamas, which still retains control over Gaza, has been isolated from discussions and has pushed further towards extremism. Hamas is a political force that will remain in the foreseeable future and must be incorporated in the peace process for the latter to be relevant. Palestinian officials have vocally protested continued Gaza incursions. The announcement of housing expansion has, however, been the most intractable barrier in the negotiation process because the Palestinians are non-negotiable regarding the end of settlements. The subsequent “final-status talks” have devolved into squabbles as each side makes recriminations against each other. Palestinians have become side-tracked from fundamental issues such as refugees or water rights to calls to end housing expansion or other surface problems. A framework for talks has yet to be decided and each side has increasingly begun to think that Annapolis will be a failure in the mold of the Oslo Accords.

There is no reason to be overly pessimistic about chances for the Annapolis process’s success. The very idea that final-status talks can happen is a positive step towards giving Palestinians self-determination and Israelis security. The rhetoric of both parties and the international community is the most hopeful it has been in years. There is, however, an unsettling disconnection between the text of the Annapolis agreement and the reality on the ground. Repressive policies persist and essentially nothing is different in the existing belligerence between the two parties. Basic confidence-building measures are, then, ineffective as the elementary level of trust between the parties breaks down. The approach to Annapolis should be that of cautious optimism. One should believe in its ability to succeed but not become overly frustrated by its setbacks. This is important because, historically, failure in negotiations causes each side to blame the other for the failure, and this leads to explosions of violence borne from frustration. For the dream of peace to become anything beyond a dream, the sincerity of the language used at Annapolis must be met by the sincerity of action on the ground.