In his first speech dedicated to Cuba in three years, President George W. Bush recently promised to maintain the embargo for as long as Cuba rejects democracy. He called upon the world to take an active role in fomenting a more democratic Cuba, and, for his part, pledged a billion dollars to a new Cuban pro-democracy fund. If this speech becomes policy, the US will invigorate the same approach that has failed to democratize Cuba for the last half century. It may, in fact, help to produce the opposite effect.

 

US presidential administrations have maintained an interest in Cuba’s post-Castro transition since Fidel took power in January of 1959. The event that has broken the silence of the Bush administration on this question is Castro’s increasingly fragile state of health. The living statesman with the longest record in office finally stepped down in July of 2007, due to failing health. His brother, Raúl, has been running Cuba as provisional president ever since, under the pretense that Fidel will recover and resume office. 

Raúl’s assumption of power has been controversial and confusing to information-starved observers. Raúl has not traditionally commanded much respect from the average Cuban; he serves as the butt of countless jokes, most playing on his supposed stupidity (a popular fabrication with no basis in fact). That Raúl would succeed Fidel has been common knowledge for some time, but Raúl’s position as head of the military, combined with his lack of charisma, have long inspired fear among anti-Communists that a regime led by him would  lack legitimacy and maintain itself through force. 

When the moment came, however, moderate opponents of the Castro regime began to see Raúl as something different. Unlike Fidel, Raúl is a respected administrator. He has been operating the state-run, military-administered tourism enterprises, demonstrating an affinity with capitalism. Although he has shown no signs that he intends to democratize Cuba politically, he clearly wants to open Cuba up economically. He has called for a normalization of relations with the US, and many believe that he will support the limited growth of private businesses on the island. This approach has prompted observers to compare him to Deng Xiaoping.

Diehard Castro critics, however, fail to see the difference. Bush is one of these, and it is therefore not surprising that Bush would be unreceptive to Raúl’s offer to normalize relations. Unlike China, Cuba does not offer economic possibilities attractive enough to ignore ideological dissonance, but the unrestrained aggression of Bush’s language and plan of action are cause for concern.

Bush’s speech has already begun to serve its purpose of riling the Cuban government.  Spokesmen have accused Bush of inciting violence and planning intervention. His “Fund for Democracy” proposal has also invited criticism; the plan would provide a billion yet-to-be-raised dollars for Cuban economic aid, on the condition that Cuba institutes the basic trappings of modern democracy such as first amendment freedoms and periodic free elections. This offer is not to be taken seriously, as there is no chance that the Cuban government will bite at it; Cuba already receives twice this amount annually from Venezuela alone.

Such posturing does nothing to strengthen Cuba’s dissident community. The Cuban opposition consists of two poles. One, led by Osvaldo Payá, works to reform the current government rather than overthrowing it; it has publicly sworn off US support, and must work diligently to avoid being branded as an agent of imperialism. The other, led by Marta Beatriz Roque, accepts American funding and support, and for this reason it is consigned to the fringes of Cuban political activity. By aligning himself with these movements, whether they want his help or not, Bush is ultimately weakening them by justifying government accusations that they are mere mouthpieces of foreign interests. 

So why do it? There are two possibilities, which are not mutually exclusive. Bush may not really care what occurs on the island, and instead, he addresses his message to conservative Cuban Americans, part of his own constituency. Or, the Bush Administration may be planning to finance an unpopular group into power, no matter how unlikely their chances. As Bush states, “The operative word in our future dealings with Cuba is not stability; the operative word is freedom.” It may be better for all involved if Fidel survives the Bush administration – otherwise Cuba may end up with neither.

References:

Olivier Knox, “Bush:  World Must Shape Post-Castro- Cuba.”  AFP 25 Oct 2007.  http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20071025/pl_afp/uscubapoliticsbush_071025135028

Antonio Rodriguez.  “Bush Call for Cuba Democracy Fund Likely to Fall on Deaf Ears: Experts.” 

AFP  25 Oct 2007. http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20071025/pl_afp/uscubapolitics_071025182021

Andres Oppenheimer.  “Bush’s Speech Was Only Half Right.”  Miami Herald 24 Oct 2007.  http://www.miamiherald.com/news/columnists/andres_oppenheimer/story/282861.html