Implications of the European Security and Defense Policy on Trans-Atlantic Relations

The 1990s were a time of great uncertainty for the Atlantic allies.  As the apparent hegemon, the United States came to question the necessity of jeopardizing US policy preferences to please its traditional European allies.  On the other side, Europe was becoming increasingly bold on the global stage, going so far as to declare the Bosnian War a European problem to be dealt with by Europe.  By 1999, it was apparent that Europe did not have the military capabilities to prevent mass murder and war even at its doorstep in the Balkans; Europe was humiliated to have required US assistance in stopping the conflicts.¹ From this experience, the US became increasingly skeptical about working with its European allies, who seemed incapable of pulling their own weight, and Europe came to recognize its need to boost European capabilities if European countries truly wanted to play an increased role in the global arena.

Recognizing the lessons of the Balkan wars, in 1998, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac announced their intention to build a modern and more autonomous European military capability. The bilateral St. Malo Declaration boldly stated that:

 …the European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role in the international stage. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis, acting in conformity with our respective obligations to NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization].

This declaration initiated the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which came to include the creation of a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) of 60,000 troops as well as multiple European Battlegroups of 1500 soldiers each. All of these forces will be able to deploy abroad quickly and sustain themselves autonomously for extended periods of time. To help procure the technologies necessary to support such expeditionary forces, a European Defense Agency (EDA) has been created to coordinate procurement and has a limited budget to conduct research.  All this is being done at the integrated EU level (Flournoy, Smith, et al. 2005).

The United States has been pushing for stronger European capabilities since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed creating NATO in 1949.  While it was clear there would be asymmetrical military contributions between Europe and the United States from the outset, many US policymakers are historically frustrated by what they see as European free-riding on US security expenditures: European governments let the US cover their defense expenses, and use the savings to fund lavish welfare states (Reid 2004, 178).

Despite past US efforts to promote European defense capabilities, the idea of a strong European military that can act autonomously of the United States in the form of ESDP, has raised the guard of some in the United States.  Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld commented, “Of course we have been urging the Europeans to take a larger role, but we do want our friends to remember the contribution that NATO has made on the continent, and we would not want this new force to undermine in any way our traditional alliance” (Reid 2004, 179). Furthermore, the Russian envoy to NATO, Aleksandr Vershbow, has said that the ERRF is, “a dagger pointed at NATO’s heart” (Reid 2004, 179).

This paper explores four specific threats that the creation of a more autonomous ESDP may pose to the United States.  These include fears that ESDP is being built as a counterweight to the United States; that it will replace NATO; that ESDP will allow Europe to take market share away from the US defense industry; and that ESDP represents a trend of strategic and value divergence that will ultimately lead to war between the United States and Europe.  While it is true that ESDP may have some negative implications for the United States, particularly in the industrial realm, the overall impact of ESDP will be positive for the United States and will outweigh the costs.  Furthermore, stronger and more modern European capabilities are necessary for the European Allies to keep their part of the Atlantic bargain. ESDP is not being built as a counterweight to the US or a replacement for NATO, and it will certainly not lead to war between the US and Europe.  

Four Areas of Concern

One – War Between the EU and the US is on the Horizon

Charles Kupchan believes Europe and the United States are moving toward war.  Kupchan argues that Europe is a rising power, capable of effectively balancing the United States, whose interests are so divergent with those of the United States that conflict is inevitable (Kupchan 2002).  During an interview, Martin Briens from the French Embassy explained that the European Union will never engage the United States with military force because even if it wanted to, the vast and expanding gap in military capabilities across the Atlantic means the European Union would not have a fighting chance (Briens 2005). Indeed, the US currently spends more than the European Union, Russia, and China combined on defense per annum (Reid 2004). US doctrine in multiple contexts explicitly states US strategy is to maintain an overwhelming military preponderance so that no adversary will consider attacking or challenging US supremacy.² This means that in both practice and doctrine, the gap is growing wider as the US continues to outspend its allies and foes.

Even if Europe drastically increases its military spending, it would require several decades before it could catch up with US defense capabilities. Furthermore, the concept of a bellicose Europe does not fit in with Europe’s post-World War II aversion to violent conflict. In sum, the proposition that the EU and the US are bound for war is poorly founded.

Two – ESDP Threats to United States Industry

A key aspect of ESDP is that it will improve European countries’ buying power through encouraging joint-procurement contracts between countries (where multiple countries order the same product at once so as to drop unit prices through economies of scale). Most often joint-contracts are signed with European companies rather than American, which in turn allows European industry to expand. This expansion of EU industry will have two effects. First, as the demand for European goods increases, it will chip away at US market-share.  Second, as European industries become more competitive, they will be able to produce a more diverse and higher quality array of products, which in turn will challenge the US virtual monopoly in producing several armaments.

Europe’s Grab at Market-Share

The global arms market is zero-sum, meaning that gains for one firm mean losses for another. In order to help domestic firms, governments can use strategic trade policy (giving a subsidy to domestic firms) to provide their firms advantage in a market they otherwise may not have been competitive in.  In essence, this allows the opportunity for domestic firms to “steal” market-share from foreign firms through government assistance, even if they otherwise could not provide competitive prices (Dick 1993).

A classic example of this can be seen in the battle between the world’s two dominant aircraft manufacturers, Boeing and Airbus.  In this case, the less competitive European firm Airbus was able to enter the aircraft market in the 1970s and earn contracts against the more well-established US firm Boeing through the help of hefty European subsidies. These subsidies allowed Airbus to sell products to compete against Boeing at lower prices than they would have been able to without the government assistance, thereby allowing Airbus to remain competitive and gain market-share at the expense of Boeing. It was only within the past couple years that Airbus finally managed to produce a profit, yet still the firm has managed to increase its market-share consistently over the past few decades as seen by Figure 1:

Figure 1: Market Share 1996-2005

Thus, Europe has used strategic trade policy to “steal” market-share away from the United States in the area of airplane production by allowing Europe to become more competitive in the global market. This is a particularly relevant case because Boeing and Airbus produce both commercial and military aircraft.    

While strategic trade policy in the form of subsidies are not likely to become a major component of ESDP, the EU is using supranational coordination to encourage European-based procurement, which will have the same effect as strategic trade policy by allowing European industries to become more competitive based on government directed assistance.  That is, European countries are engaging in procurement projects that will only use European defense firms, even if US firms can provide more competitive prices. As European firms become more competitive, they will take market-share from the United States, having the same devastating effects on the US defense industry as European subsidies did for Boeing.  

Recent European joint-procurement contracts make it clear that Europe intends to direct ESDP toward utilizing European firms, even if they are not currently the most competitive on the market. This is driven by the electoral concerns of EU politicians who aim to gain profitable contracts for domestic producers. In most joint-contracts, each signing member ensures that a portion of the production process is sent home. One example is a joint-procurement contract signed in 2004 between six EU nations for IRIS-T air-to-air missiles, which are, “the most modern weapon to equip the Eurofighter” (Agüera 2005).³ German defense spokesman Bernd Siebert stated upon initial delivery in 2005 that, “The success story of IRIS-T reflects the will and capability of Germany to equip its soldiers with the best-possible materiel and take on a pioneering and leadership role. It is an essential contribution to maintain core capacities of the German defense industry and to maintain international competitiveness” (Agüera 2005). While the German company Diehl BGT Defense was the prime contractor for the missile program, each of the five other countries in the project had parts of the production process subcontracted domestically.

This emphasis on European-based procurement indicates that this component of ESDP is as much driven by the desire to help European industry as it is by the desire to modernize Europe’s military forces. A statement made by Jean-Marie Poimboeuf, chief executive of French warship builder DCN, rearticulates this point from the producer perspective: he argues that a joint-contract/cooperation between France and Germany in the production and purchase of new conventional attack submarines is necessary to keep Europe in the conventional submarine market.  Without cooperation, Europe will, “risk losing its leadership in conventional submarines” to competition from other producers such as India, South Korea, and Russia (Tran 2005). With Goldman Sachs estimating the export market for submarines at $90 billion over the next 25 years, it is easy to see why Euro-industry executives are pushing their governments to keep them in the market (Tran 2005).

A rise in European-based joint-procurement projects will allow European firms to receive larger orders per contract, permitting them to benefit from economies of scale and thereby to decrease prices and increase profits.  As European countries turn away from US industry to make their defense purchases, ESDP will be directly responsible for promoting a policy that damages the profitable US advantage in the arms industry.  

Threat to US Monopoly on Critical Components

As European countries become more competitive, their increase in market share and profits will be accompanied with an increase in the quality of the goods they produce and diversification of their product lines simultaneously.  In sum, Europe will be able to provide a larger number of products at lower prices, which is why US market-share is threatened. Yet company profits are not the only thing lost as the EU improves its industry; the US government currently maintains a monopoly on many interstate contracts for critical arms inputs that only it can produce or maintain at reasonable prices. This allows the US to have virtual veto power over who can buy what weapons systems.

The debunking of a recent deal between Spain and Venezuela that the United States opposed demonstrates how the US uses its monopoly on critical arms inputs to benefit US security policy.  Spain intended to sell 12 aircraft (valued at 1.2 billion euros) to Venezuela.  However, the United States refused to provide critical inputs to Spain, forcing Spain to scrap the project, “because it would be too costly to strip them of U.S.-made components whose transfer is governed by Washington” (Agüera 2006). In this case, the Spanish producers’ ability to provide competitively cheap airplanes depends on US inputs, including US plane engines and fuel management systems. Due to its strained relationship with Venezuela at the time of the deal, the US has chosen to veto exports of the US produced inputs, thereby using the US advantage on these critical components to support US security policy.

The United States does not have an absolute monopoly on these inputs; Spain could still choose to produce the airplanes using alternative European manufactured inputs. However, after investigating its options, the Spanish airplane producer EADS-CASA has concluded it would be too difficult and expensive to replace the American parts because, “swapping in European-made parts would add 1.5 million euros per plane plus the difficult-to-estimate costs of design and certification” (Agüera 2006). If the EU does manage to successfully improve its domestic industrial capabilities, the costs of European components will fall. This will in turn chip away at the US advantage in critical arms inputs, thereby removing the US ability to veto arms-deals between EU nations and third-parties that it sees as challenging US interests.

Galileo and the US Monopoly on Intelligence

Perhaps the most controversial of European procurement projects is in the realm of satellite-based positioning technology. Traditionally, the United States held a monopoly on the most effective satellite positioning technology, GPS (Global Positioning Systems).  While information from the system is largely available to its European allies, the United States reserves the ability to black out geographical regions to the advantage of US intelligence units.  This may occur if the US is concerned that Europe will deliver sensitive intelligence information to third-parties against US wishes.  In response, the EU has begun research and development in the area of satellite based global positioning in a project titled Galileo. This means that in a hypothetical situation, Europe equipped with Galileo will be able to circumvent a US imposed GPS blackout to gain intelligence that the US did not want it to have. US policy-makers are frustrated by the Galileo project, because it threatens the US monopoly on sensitive intelligence.

Three – Europe as a Counterweight to the United States

Some in Europe are concerned that an unchecked United States hegemony will use its military, economic, and cultural dominance to pursue its own narrow interests (Kagan 2004). According to this logic, the European Union has decided that building a European military capability is the best way to counter the threat of US hegemony.  Jeffrey Cimbalo argues that there is “strong evidence France and Germany seek to balance,” the United States, based on their policies of rejecting US actions in Iraq (Cimbalo 2004). While a small faction of policy makers – not limited to but most notoriously from France – have expressed such aims, the concept of a European counterweight to the United States in the realm of security is both myopic and unrealistic.

The idea that Europe aims to become a counterweight to the United States largely stems from use of the term “autonomy” in describing the purpose of ESDP.  While it is true that achieving a level of autonomous capabilities is a key goal of ESDP, some US analysts interpret autonomy as meaning Europe will have power on par with the US, and will choose to use it against US interests. That is, the more power Europe gets, the more opportunity it will have to challenge the US both within NATO and in global geopolitics. Accordingly, as Europe increasingly comes to challenge the United States in the global arena, ESDP will be seen as the source of Europe’s ability to do so.  This perspective is fallacious because Europe does not have the power to counter the United States and the US and Europe shares many of the same global objectives.

Europe Does Not Have the Power

Even under a highly effective ESDP that manages to modernize European military capabilities, European countries will not be able to attain the level of military capabilities necessary to challenge the US.  European missions remain largely dependent on US support to this day, as reflected by the Berlin Plus Agreement, which allows Europe to utilize NATO (ie- US) resources in certain missions such as the EUFOR stabilization mission in the Balkans. The EU requires this support because its military capabilities are drastically below what would be necessary to perform such a mission autonomously (Flournoy, Smith, et al. 2005). As previously pointed out, only 3-4 percent of Europe’s forces are currently “expeditionary deployable”, and the trajectories of European spending on the military and military R&T do not suggest that there will be a drastic rise in European capabilities in the foreseeable future.

Even if Europe manages to reach its current ESDP goals of having 60,000 troops available through ERRF, deployable within 45 days of being called, it is difficult to imagine a scenario where such a force could be used to actively counter the United States. These procurement goals have been set to match the Headline Goal objectives, which include providing a force for quick extraction missions (such as retrieving civilian personnel from European embassies under fire), or missions that fall under the Petersberg tasks, which include peacekeeping, humanitarian, and crisis management operations.⁴ The desired ability to deploy 60,000 troops does not allow much room to take on more intense missions than those defined by the Petersberg tasks.     

Shared Objectives Means More EU Leverage, But Not A Counterweight   

There have always been differences across the Atlantic regarding security strategy. Regardless, the volatile nature of the Cold War, which placed Europe in the shadow of a Soviet invasion, led Europe to follow US leadership more obediently than it may otherwise have. In the post-Cold War world, even though European and NATO security concerns have expanded to a global scale, they are also less severe in nature. The fact that the EU can afford to send humanitarian aid to the Congo or border guards to Palestine shows just how much the world has changed. During the Cold War, the Soviet threat allowed little time for such concerns to receive more than a passing mention.  

Today the world is a safer place for the West, at least in the immediate wake of the Cold War.  A decrease in immediate threats means the European countries are not as dependent on the US to provide for their security, and therefore are less likely to make concessions to placate US desires. The greatest security threats are currently rogue states and terrorism. Sadaam Hussein’s Iraq hardly presented the same level of immediate threat to Europe in 2003 as the Soviet Union did 20 years earlier; this contrast allowed European nations greater flexibility when deciding whether or not to support the US invasion of Iraq.  The decision by some European countries to not support the US in 2003 is not related to their military capabilities (meaning ESDP is not a source of this opposition), but rather because changes in the international security environment means that countries who feel a lower level of threats, and therefore a lower level of dependency on US protection, will be less likely to cooperate when they are particularly opposed to a given mission.

This does not mean that these countries are rising as a counterweight to the US. It should be recalled that there have been debates within the transatlantic relationship since its indoctrination, ranging from the Suez Crisis in 1956 to the Iraq invasion in 2003, and more.  The difference today is not that these disagreements exist, but rather how states will respond when they are opposed to a particular mission.  Despite a lower willingness to compromise, European countries, including France and Germany, still “cooperate with the US on 19 of 20 issues” (Tilleman 2005). The range of missions Europe is already pursuing demonstrates the alignment between European and US objectives: European forces make up the majority of the ISAF and EUFOR stabilization missions in Afghanistan and the Balkans; the EU sent military police to monitor the Rafah border between Egypt and Palestine; EU personnel are training Iraqi officers⁵; the EU sent security personnel to monitor the recent elections in the Congo; the EU sent police advisors to assist in Georgia, etc (Goebel 2005).

These are only a few of the EU’s current missions. As they suggest though, EU missions to date have fallen under the rubric of the Petersberg Tasks, being a stabilization mission, humanitarian mission, or personnel extraction operation.  Even if Europe does accomplish its procurement goals as defined by the Headline Goal, it will not be able to take on missions more intensive than those permitted by its forces, which are defined by the Petersberg Tasks. It is difficult to imagine the US opposing any stabilization or humanitarian mission, and so Europe’s inability to take on more intensive missions than the Petersberg Tasks means that the EU will not take on missions that threaten US interests, if such a mission exists.

As the number of European missions increases, their scale decreases, and their locations extend beyond Europe’s borders, it becomes clear that European states will need an expeditionary force capability that is autonomous of the US.  This is because the US is not likely to become involved in all of these missions, not because the US is opposed to European objectives, but rather because the US has a limited military capacity and cannot afford to front the bill for European operations, even if they benefit the alliance as a whole. Many of these missions are being performed specifically to help relieve pressure on the US’s military which is currently overextended.  Europe’s willingness to oppose the US on a single mission such as Iraq should not be mistaken as indicating an irreparable split in the Alliance, particularly since nearly all European countries are now involved in the Iraqi reconstruction, including those who initially opposed the invasion.

When Europe does disagree with the US, it is usually on an individual issue, and the debate is not over an outcome, but rather the strategy to achieve that outcome. For example, in pre-invasion 2003, all Western countries would like to have seen a peaceful, free-market, democratic, and Sadaam-free Iraq. The debate was not over these ends, but rather over the means to achieve them. The US felt an invasion needed to be done quickly, while its European Allies felt the US was moving too fast and that invasion would not guarantee the desired outcomes. The greatest cost to the US in not convincing its allies was losing both their military support and legitimacy for the mission. The loss of European support did not mean Europe actively sought to hamper the US initiative, but rather that it would not give a helping hand.

To run a hypothetical scenario, imagine that the EU did have a strong military force while it was debating whether or not Iraq should be invaded. For this scenario we can imagine Europe has a force on par with the United States⁶.  Even if factions in Europe opposed the US invasion of Iraq in this scenario, as they did in 2003, it is doubtful that they would have used their military strength to counter US efforts.  Having a stronger military force would have instead boosted the European voice at the strategy table, in that it would have put upward pressure on the US’s willingness to cooperate with its partners.⁷ If the ability of Europe’s military to aid in the Iraq mission increased at a greater level then the costs of cooperation faced by the US, then the US may have chosen to work with its allies. In this scenario, a stronger European ally does not mean the US mission would have been jeopardized, but rather more options would have been on the table for the US. That is, having a stronger military does not make the EU a hostile counterweight, though it does provide leverage as European countries will have more to offer at the strategic planning table.

A real example of Europe using its capabilities as leverage within the Alliance took place in 2005 when Europeans were contemplating sending an additional 6,000 troops to Afghanistan, which would raise the total number of ISAF forces to 16,000.  At a NATO meeting on December 7th, final approval of this pending deployment “became entangled” with the controversial issue of US foreign prisoner treatment, as well as the suspected holding of terrorist suspects in secret US prisons located across Europe. “The Netherlands [was] to supply 1,200 of those troops, but it refused to agree until it received assurances that any detainees captured there would be treated humanely” (Brinkley 2005). According to Brinkley, by the end of the meeting European countries felt they had achieved the reassurances they were looking for.

This is exactly what Europe is hoping enhanced capabilities will provide within NATO; Europe will be able to provide a capability option to NATO, such as the deployment of 6,000 troops to Afghanistan, enticing the United States to give concessions on certain issues if it wants to utilize these capabilities.  The United States always has the option of not working with its allies, yet the fact that there is an option in the first place benefits the United States.  If Europe has no capabilities, then the US would have needed to provide the 6,000 troops of its own to sustain the stabilization mission in Afghanistan.

The fact is, European allies either will or will not have useful capabilities to operate alongside the United States in today’s security environment – either way, the US has vast superiority in its capabilities and can decide to act with or without the support of its allies.  When the Europeans do have capabilities that are strategically beneficial, the United States will have to address European concerns and perspectives if it wants to utilize these capabilities in joint-operations.

While sporadic disagreements such as those over Iraq are expected, it is unlikely that the Atlantic alliance is diverging. For the Alliance to come under true threat, more than the strategies for achieving a particular outcome will need to be debated; instead, the desired outcomes themselves will need to become the topic of debate. It is unlikely, in the context of widespread cooperation that persists in the Alliance to date, as well as consistently shared objectives in the global arena, that such a pattern of habitual disagreement will arise between the US and its European Allies.  Because members of the Atlantic Alliance share the same threats and general objectives, they have more incentive to cooperate than to counter each other.

Finally, even if a country like France does want to counter the US with a European counterweight, it will be hard pressed to present a strong front. France alone will not have the capabilities to challenge the US… it would require a pan-EU effort. As seen by the inter-European divide that occurred in the lead-up to the Iraq war and continued strong relations between several European countries and the United States, it will be difficult for France to convince other EU members to actively and consistently oppose the United States. The EU as a counterweight will only be as strong as its weakest supporter, and in the foreseeable future it is unlikely that a majority of EU members will turn against the US.  In the foreseeable future, it is unlikely that France will turn against the US.

Four – ESDP Implications For NATO And A Continuing Alliance

Some concerns about ESDP are not about the fact that Europe wants to improve its autonomous capabilities, but rather that the EU may not be the appropriate venue for Europe to pursue modernization. With very small budgets allocated to defense spending as it is, the EU may be wasting resources that could better be applied in the framework of NATO.  Furthermore, while the European defense identity, “was to exist alongside and complement rather than replace NATO… many in the United States feared that a newly confident Western Europe was in fact turning away from the Atlantic Alliance” (Van Oudenaren 2005, 10).

Process With No Foundation

John Hulsman of the Heritage Foundation argues that ESDP is dead due to a long pattern of “process with no foundation” (Shirano 2005). Mr. Hulsman observes that the EU has set several ambitious goals for developing an ESDP founded on actual capabilities but despite these initiatives, the capabilities rarely materialize because the EU is, “non-functional at the foreign policy level.”  In other words, an EU Common Foreign and Security Policy has no foundation among its member states (Shirano 2005).  Mr. Hulsman supports this argument by citing a pattern of deadline extensions on ESDP procurement projects, and persistent decreases or stagnation in European national defense budgets.  From this perspective, Europe’s seeming inability to procure demonstrates a lack of political will to do more than talk about attaining new capabilities.  Mr. Hulsman believes that if ESDP is truly this unproductive, then ESDP initiatives are a waste of resources that could better be used to transform European forces in the framework of NATO.

ESDP is not dead though; in fact – it is just coming to life. ESDP is a nascent project and while it is true that EU capabilities are slow to develop, often seeming to move at a “glaciers pace,” the fact is that contracts and procurements (such as ERRF) are taking place (Smith 2005). Their seemingly slow development is largely the result of a small defense budget. These defense budgets will be strained regardless of whether modernization is pursued through EU or NATO initiatives because Europe’s expensive welfare state combined with spending limits imposed by the EU Stability and Growth Pact mean that increases in European defense spending is unrealistic, especially considering that two of the biggest EU defense spenders, France and Germany, are already habitual violators of the Stability and Growth Pact.⁸

Despite these resource constraints, European countries are still able to transform their military capabilities by spending smarter, even if they do not spend more (Flournoy, Smith, et al. 2005).  While there are many innovative cooperative strategies that are helping Europe procure more for less, and thus spend its defense budgets more effectively, this paper will only delve into one such strategy: joint procurement contracts. Joint procurement contracts provide a better understanding of how one-way cooperation at the EU level can act as a catalyst for enhanced capabilities, even without increases in defense budgets.   

Joint procurement contracts take advantage of economies of scale to allow a larger quantity of equipment to be purchased at cheaper costs per-capita.  Some recent examples include: several European states have agreed to procure the A400M “to modernize their airlift fleets by 2010;” the first missiles of a six-country one billion euro contract for 4,000 IRIS-T short range air-to-air missiles has been delivered to Germany in December 2005; France and Italy recently signed a joint contract to build 27 naval frigates to be completed between 2010 and 2020 (Agence 2005; Agüera 2005; Defensenews.com 2005; Flournoy, Smith, et al. 2005). By joining together and spending aggregately, European states have been able to decrease the amount of money they pay per ship, missile, and air-carrier due to economies of scale.

The EU provides a better venue than NATO for cooperative procurement solutions because it provides a European solution to a European problem. NATO too can implement procurement initiatives, such as the NATO Response Force (NRF), which is almost identical in purpose and form to the ERRF.  Nonetheless, European legislators are more likely to respond positively within the context of the EU, because many see NATO as dominated by the United States. Working within the EU provides a greater sense of control for Europeans, and therefore may lead to increased approval for modernization projects that are not tarnished by US pressure (Briens 2005).

Considering Britain and France called for a transformation in European capabilities only eight years ago, what has been achieved thus far is impressive and indicates, “concrete steps toward [defense] integration” (Gorka 2005). Americans who complain of lethargy in EU capability development forget that cooperation at the level of ESDP is a nascent project.  European states are taking the revolutionary step of opening their national security apparatus to European neighbors – in essence they are transcending one of the most sensitive aspects of national sovereignty in order to more effectively build and integrate capabilities in the context of constrained resources.

This level of cooperation is evidence that the ESDP is more than “process without foundation”, and in fact is grounded in a common commitment among EU countries to improve Europe’s force projection abroad.  This commitment is driven by the need to protect EU interests around the world. Furthermore, the fact that ESDP will largely be driven by EU industry through European-based procurement contracts further demonstrates that ESDP is more than overture, but in fact will be driven by state incentives. That is, the gains from military procurement will not just come in the form of military assets, but will also benefit European firms and therefore provide an added incentive for governments to continue investing in modernization.

Same Solider, Different Patches    

Finally, a soldier equipped in Europe is a soldier equipped to meet all European obligations. While both NATO and the EU have programs to encourage capability development, EU initiatives do not detract from the development of NATO forces. This is because no matter where equipment is developed, it will be used by the same troops.  For example, the same British, French, and Danish troops are used in NATO, the ERRF, and national armies; the only thing that changes for a European soldier in any given mission is the patch on his shoulder. In a time of limited budgets and defense spending, the best option for the United States is to support any kind of initiative that encourages increased capabilities among its European allies.

Conclusion: The Alliance in a New World

ESDP potentially holds some costs for the US. Of particular concern to US firms will be the rise in competition and the subsequent potential loss in market share that will be associated with EU-based initiatives that will specifically use European outputs rather than the traditional American firms. However, this may not be all bad in of itself: an infusion of foreign competition into the defense industry may in fact lower global prices and increase the quality of products available to government consumers. It is therefore possible that while in the short-run, US firms will lose out, in the long run the government may benefit from the corollaries of increased market competition. However, even if the government does benefit from the increased competition, the US will still lose its virtual monopoly on critical arms and intelligence inputs as European countries are able to produce these goods alternatively.

Despite these potential costs that ESDP will place on the United States, ESDP overall is beneficial to the US, and in fact necessary if the NATO Alliance is to persevere. The end of the Cold War has changed the global environment and has also changed each member of the transatlantic alliance’s global perspective and ambitions: NATO’s focus is now global, where it was once constrained to focus within Europe’s Cold War borders; the European Union has explicitly stated its intention to become a global player; and with the end of the Balkan Wars, the United States has become increasingly weary of giving concessions to its European Allies when they have few capabilities to contribute to any given mission.

For the Atlantic Alliance to endure, its European members need to modernize their armed forces in a way that will allow them to fulfill their role within the Alliance so that the US will take them seriously. Furthermore, in this environment where missions are smaller in scale and global in nature, it is unrealistic to expect that the US will always be able to contribute toward missions, even if it shares the mission’s objective. European nations need expeditionary force autonomy, not so they can counter their US ally, but so they can pursue missions that accomplish mutual objectives. Strengthening Europe will only strengthen the transatlantic alliance.

Notes:

1.    The United States played the predominant role in the Balkan conflict, having flew 70-80% of air missions over Kosovo and dropped 80% of the precision munitions. Furthermore, today only 3-4% of the 1.9 million European troops are “expeditionary deployable” (Flournoy and Smith 2005, 42). US frustration is particularly strong because despite taking the burden, the US still had to endure frustrating negotiations with its European allies on how to conduct the Balkan wars.

2.    Both the US National Security Strategy (2002 and 2006) and a new draft Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations (2005) explain that the US security strategy is to maintain an overwhelming military capability.  For example, the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/jp3_12fc2.pdf> states that US nuclear capabilities need to deter, “aggression and coercion by deploying forward the capacity to swiftly defeat attacks and imposing severe penalties for aggression on an adversaries military capability or supporting infrastructure,” p.I-1.

3.    The “Eurofighter” is another joint-contracted European-based procurement project, which exhibits the same characteristics as the IRIS-T Missile contract.  It is discussed in greater detail later.

4.    The Petersberg tasks were defined by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 as the kinds of missions that a EU Common Foreign and Security Policy would pursue.

5.    While France is one of the largest contributors toward this mission, it and Germany refuse to train officers within Iraq itself. Briens, Martin: Counselor on Political and Military Affairs at the French Embassy, Washington, DC. Interview conducted by author on 13 December 2005.

6.    Such a force is unlikely to develop as both a function of EU budget trajectory (they are not spending enough).

7.    For an equational model explaining the relationship between European defense capabilities and the US willingness to give concessions to its allies, refer to Atwell, Kyle, “Why the European Security and Defense Policy Exists:  An Equational Method,” in [italics Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union], ed. Christina Faegri,  Claremont, CA: European Union Center of California, 2006.

8.    The Stability and Growth pact limits euro-member states (currently 12 of the 25 European countries are in the euro zone) to a budget deficit of no more than three percent of GDP, lest the face penalties. While several states have violated this pact since its inception, actual enforcement of penalties have yet to materialize. 

References:

Agence France-Presse, Paris. 2005.  “France, Italy Sign Multi-Billion-Euro Frigate Deal.” Defensenews.com/

Agüera, Martin. 2005. “First IRIS-T Missiles Delivered to German Air Force.” Defensenews.com/

Agüera, Martin. 2006. “U.S. Rules May Force Spain To Scrap Venezuela Sale.” Defensenews.com/

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Kyle Atwell graduated from the University of California at Davis in December 2006 with a degree in Economics and International Relations. His studies focus on security policy, with special emphasis on transatlantic security, western military intervention, democracy-studies, military industry and technology, and US nuclear doctrine. This paper is modified from a chapter of a book he is currently working on which provides an in-depth look at why ESDP exists, and its impact on the transatlantic alliance. Kyle also works with the Roosevelt Institution student think tank in Washington, DC.

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