Russia is currently the greatest source of nuclear weapons, fissile material, and technical assistance to terrorists such as al Qaeda due to the deplorable lack of physical security and accountability surrounding Russia’s nuclear establishment, the desperation of the scientists and lower-level nuclear facility employees (as a result of their subjugation to terrible working conditions and minimalist wages), and the wide-spread government corruption and organized criminal circuits. In this article, I will explore the level of insider threat that exists in Russia’s nuclear establishment and how the poor security surrounding Russian fissile material and nuclear warheads may contribute to nuclear terrorism.

Insider Threats:

Insider threat is a central issue in the security of Russia’s nuclear stockpiles. During the Cold War, over one million individuals were employed throughout the ten closed nuclear cities which required entry and exit visas. These people were involved in the enrichment and reprocessing processes of the fissile material as well as the weapon designs of the nuclear warheads. Any of these scientists (retired or actively involved in Russia’s nuclear establishment) may be tempted to sell any information they have on how to build a nuclear device.¹ As of 2000, there were over 20,000 employed nuclear specialists in Russia. There are around 2,000 – 3,000 individuals in Russia who could design or assist in the designing of a nuclear bomb and about 10,000 – 15,000 that have critical knowledge of particular aspects of nuclear weapon design/manufacture or fissile material production. Most of these individuals would be employed at the nuclear weapons facilities and nuclear design laboratories.² As of 2000, total employment at nuclear military facilities was 75,000, and there are thousands of employees with access to nuclear materials and/or secrets who may be forced to retire soon leaving them with no future income.³

Due to poor job quality issues, employees at the Russian nuclear sites are becoming increasingly incompetent. According to the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia, the US General Accounting Office reported in 2001 that guards at these facilities leave gates open and unattended, they leave equipment inoperable, and they don’t check for identification before personnel enter into highly secured areas storing nuclear material. For example, in 2005, a resident of the closed nuclear city of Lesnoy (a major nuclear weapon assembly and disassembly facility) entered the facility wearing fatigues and a fake identification badge with the name and photograph of the leader of the Chechen terrorist, Salmon Raduev. ⁶ He was able to enter three guarded checkpoints and into the weapons facility. The guards obviously were not paying any attention to this individual carrying identification with the name and photograph of an enemy of the state.⁷

Survival is not the only motivating factor behind the sales of nuclear material and weapons designs, greed and corruption has also played a significant role in the creation of the black market for nuclear devices. Because of the demand for weapons designs and fissile material from terrorists and rogue states, a Russian scientist or a lower-level employee at a nuclear site can make hundreds of thousands if not millions of dollars on the black market. Corrupt government officials pose even a greater threat since they have access to reserves of weapons and have contacts in the organized, Russian crime circuit; hence, they have the supplies and the connections to make successful deals on the black market. Russian criminals around the world have longstanding ties to the former Soviet military and intelligence organizations. In fact, some of the members of the Russian organized crime groups are scientists and former Soviet KGB agents with access to sophisticated weapons.⁸ There are already established networks between Russian organized crime and the military in order to sell conventional military hardware and drugs, and it is likely that these networks have exported weapons of mass destruction.⁹

Fissile Material in Russia and the Former Soviet Republic:

Highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium are particularly easy to sell on the black market because they are easier to steal and transport, and they emit low levels of radiation. Some experts believe that a large amount of HEU has already been removed from the former Soviet Union and is actively on the international black market. The lack of accountability to the amount of fissile material the former Soviet Union has can lead to the theft of this material which can be sold on the black market.

There are several examples of HEU theft from Russia. In October of 1992, 1.5 kilograms of 90 percent enriched HEU was stolen from the Luch production facility in Podolsk, Russia.¹⁰ Two Russian sailors stole 1.8 kilograms of 30 percent enriched HEU from a naval base in Adreeva Guba in July, 1993.¹¹ Seven kilograms of HEU were also stolen from the Pacific Fleet at Sovietskaya Gavan in January of 1996.¹² In 1998, there were reports of theft from Chelyabinsk Oblast. According to the chief of Minatom’s Nuclear Materials Accounting and Control Department, Viktor Yerastov, the amount stolen was enough to make an atomic bomb.¹³ As of 2005, U.S. and Russian experts succeeded in installing comprehensive upgrades to 70 percent of Russian nuclear material storage sites.¹⁴ Although this is an improvement, less than a fifth of Russia’s stockpile of weapons grade uranium has been destroyed and the destruction of excess plutonium has yet to be implemented. Most of the material is located at sites that are still awaiting their first round of security upgrades.¹⁵ It is estimated that around 50,000 nuclear bombs of fissile material are contained in 250 buildings at 50 storage sites in Russia.¹⁶

Russia’s Warheads and Tactical Weapons:

Russian nuclear weapons are currently at risk theft. The fact that Russia is uncertain of how many nuclear warheads it has in its arsenal makes accountability difficult; hence, the possibility of theft of one of these nuclear warheads is made more plausible.^{17 18} The loss of one percent of Russia’s inventory would leave 220 nuclear devices unaccounted for and accessible to terrorists.¹⁹ Terrorist can employ several hundred of the 20,000 types of nuclear bombs in Russia’s global inventory.

Tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) are Russia’s largest security issue concerning the theft of intact nuclear devices. TNWs are such a severe risk factor because they are poorly accounted for by the Russian government, they are the least regulated by arms control agreements, they are easier to transport because they are light and can be carried by one man, and there is low security surrounding the relocation points during transport.²⁰ Most of the warhead sites have yet to receive full U.S.-funded security upgrades.²¹ There are several reasons why tactical weapons are susceptible to terrorists’ seizure and use.²² Tactical nuclear weapons are easier to steal because of their light weight and their lack of permissive action links, PALs, (for the older generation warheads) or their use of more primitive PALs. Since TNWs are meant to be forward deployed due to their intended use in the battlefield against NATO’s conventional forces, they have yet to be withdrawn to central storage sites that are more secure.

Many experts believe that the acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons does not pose a significant security risk since a TNW needs maintenance every six months in order to remain functional. A terrorist would need detailed knowledge of the design of Soviet warheads in order to replace necessary components such as tritium or the neutron generator, two radioactive materials that decay with time.²³ But due to the threat of insider technical support in Russia and Pakistan, overcoming these obstacles is quite possible. If the terrorists were incapable of using the tactical nuclear device due to a lack of maintenance, the fissile material within the device can still be retrieved and used in the assembly of a terrorists’ own improvised nuclear weapon.

Conclusion:

The United States needs to prevent al Qaeda from possessing a nuclear device by preventing the exportation of nuclear weapons, fissile material, and nuclear intelligence between states. Theft also needs to be impeded. Physical security surrounding the nuclear storage sites in Russia desperately needs to be strengthened and despite improvements in the working and living conditions amongst employees of Russia’s nuclear program further support for these employees needs to be substantially increased in order to prevent the “brain drain” of nuclear expertise from occurring. Stronger international cooperation between Russia and the United States needs to take place so that the implementation of nuclear security and reduction programs, such as Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar’s Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.

References:

1. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Times Books, 2004), p. 73.

2. Bunn, Matthew and Wier, Anthony, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action (Cambridge MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2004) p. 65.

3. Ibid.

4. Bunn, Matthew and Wier, Anthony, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action (Cambridge MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2006), p. 88

5. Bertsch, Gary K., Human Factor and Security Culture: Challenges to Safeguarding Fissile Material in Russia (Athens, GA.: Center for International Trade and Security, November 2002), p. 20., Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces (Washington D.C.: National Intelligence Council, February 2002) p. 7,http://www.odci.gov/nic/special_russiannucfac.html

6. Bunn, Matthew and Wier, Anthony, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action, (2006) pp. 11-12.

7. Ibid.

8. Scweitzer, Glenn A., Superterrorism: Assassins, Mobsters, and Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: Plenum Trade, 1998), p. 40.

9. Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists,(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 105.

10. Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists, p.98.

11. Gopal S., Nuclear Terrorism: Relevance and Prospects in South Asia, (Noida, India: South Asia Analysis Group, October 2001), http://www.saag.org/papers4/paper359.html., p. 1.

12. Ibid.

13. Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces (Washington D.C.: National Intelligence Council, February 2002), http://www.odci.gov/nic/special_russiannucfac.html, p.9.

14. Bunn, Matthew and Wier, Anthony, The Seven Myths of Nuclear Terrorism, (Cambridge, MA: Center for Science and International Affairs, April 2005), p. 160.

15. Ibid.

16. Drell, Sydney D. and Goodby, James E., The Gravest Danger: Nuclear Weapons (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2003), p. 21.

17. Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action (2004).

18. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, p. 46

19. Clarke, Richard A., Defeating the Jihadists: A Blueprint for Action, (New York, NY: Century Foundation Press, 2004), p. 136.

20. Ferguson, Charles D. and Potter, William C., The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2004), pp. 73-74.

21. Bunn, Matthew, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: A Progress Update (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, May 2004), p. 8.

22. Ferguson and Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, p. 46-96.

23. Sokov, Nikolai and Potter,William C. “Suitcase Nukes”: A Reassessment (Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute of International Studies, September, 2002), p. 6.

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