The Role of the United States and Other Foreign Influences

Democratization, with all of its cultural intimations, has prevailed as the dominant ideological paradigm following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  The 1990s witnessed a new movement emerge out of democratic expansion and development as the West (particularly the United States) expressed desires to assist in the liberalization of all states, citing free trade and democratic peace as tangential benefits of such a system.  The implementation of this practice diverges significantly from its original language, especially following the September 11th attacks on the US.  Promises of democratization and freedom permeated the Bush administration’s campaign to gain global support for the war against Iraq and provided sufficient justification to preemptively invade a sovereign country. The stated imperative to democratize the Middle East has had a variety of policy implications, not only on behalf of the United States, but also within the foreign policy domain of many Middle Eastern states. 

The new trend of democratization, lauded by the developed world, is met in Jordan by a historical legacy of liberalizing measures dating back to 1928, when the National Pact was created allowing for representative parliamentary elections and greater accountability of government.  Actions undertaken by King Abdullah, and subsequently King Hussein, created an undercurrent of democratic principles not present in much of the Middle East.  The establishment of this tradition has provided a foundation against which future actions are measured and created a minimum level of expectations by the Jordanian population regarding political participation.  Confronted with economic adversity and political tensions emanating from the treatment of Palestinians in Israel, King Hussein resorted to a more autocratic style of rule that favors control of the political process, the media, and civil society.  External influences, such as support for the United States and Israel, have placed political pressures on the government and have undermined the legitimacy of the Jordanian regime.  While implemented reform measures are regarded as commendable relative to other Middle Eastern states, democracy in Jordan has been partial and under King Abdullah, dismissed when the regime perceives a challenge to its authority.

Establishment of the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan

The territory that later came to be identified as Jordan was initially granted under mandate status to the British, along with the regions comprising modern-day Israel, the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem.  In 1922, the British divided the mandate by establishing the semi-autonomous Emirate of Transjordan, under the leadership of the Hashemite Prince Abdullah.[1]

At a conference held in 1928, leaders proclaiming to represent the people of Jordan sought to debate the first Anglo-Jordanian treaty, which had been concluded earlier that year.  The conference further devised a political plan for action and issued the “National Pact,” which stated that parliamentary elections should be based on true representation and adopted the principle of accountability.  The National Pact served as a precursor to the National Charter of 1990 and represented an early and significant step towards the development of democracy in Jordan.

Jordan officially gained its independence on April 25, 1946, following the conclusion of the Treaty of Alliance, which secured British interests in Jordan once independence was granted.  The constitution transformed the Emirate of Transjordan into a constitutional monarchy, with much emphasis placed on executive power and the perpetuation of the patriarchal nature of government under King Abdullah.[2] The formal title of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was declared on April 26, 1949, when the West Bank territory was annexed by King Abdullah after the Arab-Israeli war of 1948.

Once Jordan gained its independence following the departure of the British, the leadership was faced with the challenge of forging a national identity in the midst of economic instability.[3]  John Roberts explains that bureaucratic patrimonialism was established as the basis for political legitimacy in Jordan, which, given its lack of significant natural resources, was dependent on external revenue sources.  The state controlled the majority of the incoming revenue, which was then distributed in such a way as to promote loyalty to the state and ensure the stability of the Hashemite regime.[4]  This relationship between the state and civil society in Jordan has thus been described as ‘rentier’ in nature, seeing that the connection between the two is not fully developed due to an over-reliance on foreign economic sources and limited political development.  King Abdullah’s attempts to base his legitimacy on his ability to control the distribution of economic resources then resulted in a lack of independent associations within Jordan.  This problem is compounded, Roberts argues, due to Jordan’s inception that resulted from a compromise between colonial powers.  Questions of legitimacy have been raised, and while foreign assistance granted authority to the leadership, the leadership was undermined and viewed as temporary.[5]  Consequently, Jordan’s creation as a state has been perceived as artificial, assembled by colonial powers, and encompassing a disparate group of people with little or no relation to each other.

Following the 1951 assassination of King Abdullah, his grandson acceded to the throne.  King Hussein assumed power in 1953 and continued the challenge to create a national identity for Jordan.  The acquisition of the West Bank territory and the Palestinian population residing there presented Jordan with the difficult task of not only establishing a national identity, but also of acculturating the Palestinians to this identity.  The annexation of the West Bank region was favored by both the British and the US.[6]   Additionally, King Hussein was increasingly viewed as a necessary player when it came to American objectives of creating peaceful relations between Israel and the Palestinians.  Jordan received over $50 million annually to ensure such support.[7]

National Identity in Jordan

With a population of 5.3 million comprised primarily of Sunni Muslim Arabs--approximately half being of Palestinian lineage--the associations between Jordan and the West Bank have been carefully interwoven throughout Jordan’s history and have presented some challenges to effectively articulating a national identity.  The desire to create a single national identity in Jordan required that integration surrounded a national symbol, and beginning in 1922, the city of Amman became this symbol.  The political and economic centers became increasingly concentrated in Amman, which emerged as Jordan’s core area.  The 1948 war with Israel and the 1950 union with the West Bank resulted in an influx of nearly 50,000 Palestinian refugees and challenged the centralized authority of Amman so that areas further westward became even more important with the expansion of the Jordanian territory.  The king, however, responded with a series of measures designed to reassert Amman’s supremacy, including the strengthening of industry and the consolidation of financial institutions; these actions were taken so that the West Bank’s development would be dependent upon funding from Amman.  During this time, Jordan’s urban population grew from 33 to 40 percent, partly due to migration of the Bedouins to the cities.[8]  Roberts explains that the sedentarization that occurred is necessary to national identity formation, as the presence of a metropolitan core creates a commonality of experiences which contribute to the development of cultural and national awareness.

Education was another means through which the Jordanian state was able to promote a national identity, despite the larger presence of Palestinians in the West Bank region, and the disparity in school attendance levels between the East and West Banks.  In 1948, nearly 50 percent of children residing in the West Bank attended school, compared to 20 percent in the East Bank.  However, the implementation of compulsory education assisted in the creation of shared experiences, another avenue through which national identities can be strengthened and disseminated.

While instrumental in orchestrating national cohesion and social stability, ultimately these policies resulted in the undermining of the king’s traditional bases of support, namely the Bedouins. This led to a general frustration over the lack of opportunities to participate in the political system.[9] 

Democracy in the Middle East--Literature Review

Despite widely believed assertions that democracy and Islam are incompatible, nascent democratic trends were present throughout the last century and numerous studies have indicated that many Muslims strongly prefer democracy to any other form of government.[10]  Factors contributing to the subversion of early democratic trends include direct foreign intervention, suppression of liberalizing movements as witnessed in Iran and Egypt, and the inconsistency with which democratic principles have been advanced by the West.

The Cold War established a policy pattern that favored predictability, which was counter to the destabilizing processes of democratization.  In seeking to maintain a balance of power with the Soviet Union and an imbalance of power between the Arabs and Israelis, the United States was not open to democratizing change in the Middle East.[11]

Ottaway and Carothers suggest possible explanations regarding Western misconceptions about democracy in the Middle East, which have animated our conflicting messages about democracy in the region.  One explanation is that Islamists present a key obstacle to Arab democracy.  The authors state, however, that Islamic parties and candidates have participated in the elections of eight Arab countries (including Jordan) throughout the past decade and have not disrupted the democratic processes.[12]  The very denial of their participation is antithetical to the fundamental principles of democracy, and as the authors point out, they are often the only non-governmental parties with a sufficiently large constituency base.  Another misconception is that Arab countries have a historical legacy of authoritarianism which predicts their future course, an idea Ottaway and Carothers dismiss, given that most societies have existed also under authoritarian rule.  Democracy, they explain, is a new phenomenon, and Arab governments have paralleled the major political trends occurring throughout most of the developed world in the last four decades.[13]  This assumption prescribes a deterministic authoritarian path for the Arab states which precludes a genuine assessment of democratization in the Middle East. 

The Role of the US in Democratic Movements in the Middle East

Guided by the three principles in the region during the Cold War, oil interests, and the security of the state of Israel, the US has assumed conflicting positions in its policies and has consequently been discredited as an agent for democratic change.  The overthrow of Mossadegh in the Iranian coup of 1953 is upheld as the seminal event in what followed as a long succession of U.S. efforts to undermine democratizing measures in the name of preserving its interests.  Support for General Zia in Pakistan, the royal family of Saudi Arabia, and others that lie outside the Middle East, exemplifies the determination of United States in preserving stability where the regime is viewed as favorable or inciting change when it poses a threat to its interests.[14]

Distrust and skepticism regarding U.S. intentions by Middle Easterners has additionally been a barrier towards recognizing a role for the United States in promoting democracy in the region.  The United States’ foreign policy history, as well as the assumption that genuine democracy in the Middle East will lead to Islamic governments, suggest that democratization is not ultimately in the US’s interests.[15]  Khan further explains that a weak, divided and undemocratic Middle East could never realize the ambitions of its peoples to successfully defeat Israel and gain cultural and political autonomy from the West. This supports the skeptic’s argument that democracy would not benefit the United States.

Ottaway and Carothers, however, explain that in the post-Cold War era and in light of the September 11th terrorist attacks, the United States’ foreign policy objectives are facing two contradictory imperatives with respect to democracy in the Middle East. Efforts to subvert al-Qaeda have led the US to seek closer ties with more autocratic regimes, while there is a concurrent belief that it is precisely the lack of democracy that has cultivated environments favorable to the flourishment and acceptance of such extremist group.[16]

Moreover, unconditional support for Israel despite its treatment of the Palestinians is regarded as a manifestation of the United States’ lack of commitment in promoting genuine democracy and peace in the Middle East.  Pew research studies indicate that people from all surveyed countries, excluding the United States, viewed the United States as too pro-Israel, with even forty-seven percent of Israelis believing it was not balanced.[17]  These commonly held perceptions further suggest that the credibility of the United States in brokering a peace deal, deemed by many as an essential precursor to the spread of democracy, is irreparably damaged and a catalyzing force of fundamentalism in the region.  As Khan concludes, there are both external and internal barriers to democratization in the Middle East, although US foreign policy has ultimately been one of the most important and influential of the external barriers.[18]

Antecedent Democratic Reforms in Jordan

As is the case in the greater Middle East, Jordan’s political development has been strongly affected by external factors.  These include the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Persian Gulf War, the Intifada and ensuing violence between the Israelis and Palestinians, and the second Gulf War in which the United States overthrew Saddam Hussein’s regime and sought to reform the political system in Iraq.  Despite these key challenges, Jordan experienced some promising attempts at liberalizing reform in the 1950s: the merger of the East and West banks, the disappearance of Abdullah from the political scene, and the initiative of a group of young, educated deputies who successfully exerted pressure to obtain constitutional change.[19]

The acquisition of the West Bank increased the electorate from 100,000 to 304,000, 157,000 of which was comprised of Palestinians.[20] The two banks were given equal representation in the lower house, and the first election after the proclamation of independence was peacefully executed.  The unification of the two banks led to a greater role for the middle class in Jordan; the Palestinian population in the West Bank was generally better educated and more organized, and effectively placed pressure on the government to enact democratic reforms.

Following the assassination of King Abdullah in 1951, a new constitution was drafted on January 2, 1952.  This new constitution introduced a parliamentary system and allowed for public participation in politics.  The legislature was permitted control over the executive, essentially ensuring cabinet accountability to the House of Representatives.  The new constitution further gave the House powers of impeachment over ministers and the cabinet and allowed it to overturn the vetoing of bills by the king pending a two-thirds majority in each chamber.  The 1952 constitution is identified as an important step in the direction of democracy and recognized the basic freedoms of opinion, expression, press, and assembly. It also established the right to form societies and political parties.[21]

Once King Hussein assumed the throne in 1953, he was forced to act as a mediator between the different political factions in Jordan.  His first years as king were characterized by liberal apertures, whereby he lifted restrictions on freedoms of speech, press and assembly.  Political parties were established and greater power was given to the parliament. This led to the October 1956 elections, which are considered the freest elections ever held in Jordan.  The expulsion of the British from the Arab Legion further cemented his popularity both within and outside of Jordan.[22]The National Socialists were the most successful party in the 1952 elections, and Sulaiman Nabulsi, given the task of forming a cabinet, created a coalition consisting of Ba’ath and Communist Party members.  Nabulsi’s government was committed to liberalizing legislation concerning political parties and the press and abrogated the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty, favoring a pro-Egyptian line in foreign policy issues.  The National Bloc coalition attracted broad base support in Jordan, diminishing the authority of the monarch and essentially challenging King Hussein’s influence.  Nabulsi was forced to resign by the liberal party members amidst great protest, and following a failed coup attempt on King Hussein, the democratic experiment was effectively dismantled and later followed by a decade of political oppression and martial law.[23]

The 1967 Arab-Israeli war altered the political system by discrediting the losing Arab regimes, thus provoking a crisis of legitimacy in Jordan.  Elections were suspended in both the East and West banks with the occupation of the West Bank. This led to the radicalization of Palestinian nationalism and increased antagonism by the Palestinians towards the king. By 1970 this resistance culminated in what is now identified as “Black September,” wherein King Hussein failed to support Palestinian extremists who hijacked four airliners, landed them in Jordan, and threatened to kill the hostages.  King Hussein ultimately took aggressive action, killing more than 3,000 Palestinians and thus reasserting his authority over the Jordanian territory.[24]  The removal of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1971 decreased direct pressure on the king, and with the increase in oil profits in the Gulf region, led to relative stability in Jordan during the following decade.[25] 
Limits on Democracy Under King Hussein: 1989-1999

While Jordan remains one of the most democratic states in the Middle East, political reforms have been undermined by continued authoritarian tendencies to preserve the power of the king.  As Quintan Wiktorowicz argues, formal institutions, practices, and participatory structures do not necessarily lead to liberal democratic societies.[26]  Despite a history of reforms in Jordan, repressive practices persist in the form of media censorship and the strict controlling of public demonstrations and grassroots organizations.

Arriving at an understanding of why the liberal measures were adopted in the first place, Wiktorowicz suggests that the reforms were initiated from above as a means of maintaining social control during a time of severe economic crisis; rather than being driven by a democratic ideology favoring openness and participation, the reforms, he argues, were implemented because of a stability imperative.[27]  Rentier states rely on external sources of income rather than domestic production or taxation, and consequently have a weaker accountability to society.  Legitimacy of the regime therefore rests upon the ability of the government to improve the quality of life through democratic principles.[28] 

Such regimes necessarily experience greater vulnerability to external fluctuation, as was the case with Jordan when it suffered from a significant decline in remittance payments following the decline in the oil market in the 1980s, as well as when its foreign assistance was cut by Washington following its lack of support for the first Gulf War.[29]  Having accumulated a debt of $6 billion, the government was forced to reduce its currency by 50 percent and to seek IMF assistance, which required structural adjustment programs unpopular with the Jordanian public.[30]  Rioting by those groups historically identified as allies of the monarchy signaled a necessity for political change.  King Hussein announced his intentions to hold elections in 1989, believing that democratization would reinforce ties to his traditional constituency base by giving them a political space to express their grievances.[31]  By 1992, however, many of the reforms were either altered or rescinded; political parties were legalized, but electoral reforms favored pro-regime candidates.[32]

In an attempt to regain the support of the United States, Jordan became one of only two countries to sign a peace agreement with Israel, reestablishing it as an important ally of the United States in the region.[33]  This strategic move was also viewed unfavorably by many Jordanians, as well as by its Arab neighbors, and undermined the legitimacy of the government and of King Hussein.

Anti-Democratic Measures Under King Abdullah: 1999 to Present

The legitimacy of King Abdullah’s monarchy and the government has been a function of the balance achieved between the economy and what has been labeled the Palestinian Question.  Since Abdullah assumed the throne in February 1999, tensions between his regime and political dissenters have intensified; he has repeatedly stated his commitment to neoliberal economic reforms, hoping that improvements in the economy will overshadow vocal opposition to the revocation of some liberal reforms.[34]  Described as semi-rentier in nature, Jordan has a relatively poor economic resource base, resulting in a high dependency on foreign aid without significant levels of taxation.[35]  Lacking a strong popular support base, King Abdullah has had to raise the level of coercion within Jordan when the country is threatened with poor economic conditions or crises of national identity, given the close connections and entwined fates of Jordan and Palestine.

One of the more contentious issues and clear manifestations of the rising level of coercion is the adoption by the King Abdullah regime, since the October 2000 Intifada, of over 100 “temporary laws.” These laws severely limit freedom of expression and assembly and make illegal criticisms of friendly nations, cases to be prosecuted in the State Security Court.[36]  Protests and rallies have become illegal without a permit and several leaders of cultural and professional associations have been arrested for criticizing state policies towards Israel, Iraq and the United States.

Another controversial law has been the amending of article 150 of the penal code, which threatens journalists with up to three years in prison for publishing articles which the government considers harmful to national unity or an incitement of protest.[37]  These temporary laws have also been used to engage in economic reforms, many of which benefit families loyal to the regime.  This has served to reinforce the perception that the king, not enjoying the popular support his father did, has been doing all he can to further entrench the traditional elites in order  to consolidate his authority.  King Abdullah has increasingly relied on the support of a tribal base and the secret police, alienating not only Palestinians, but also a wide range of individuals and former government officials who have been committed to the democratic experiment in Jordan.  The formation of the Economic Consultative Council in 2001 was further seen as a means of strengthening King Abdullah’s ties to the economic elite.[38]

The temporary laws were enacted in the absence of the parliament, which, although allowed to fulfill its term until 2001, had been disbanded in 1997. Despite constitutional mandates that new elections be held, they were delayed under the justification of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ posed by rising violence in Palestine and the potential for a U.S. offensive in Iraq.  Elections were held in 2003; however, under circumstances that favored pro-regime candidates, the legislature actually ratified many of the temporary laws which had been enacted.[39]

The 2003 parliamentary elections were held after approximately two years of delays and signified a change in representation distribution within the legislature.  The postponement of the elections was in part motivated by the regime’s fear of holding them with the second Intifada occurring nearby and the imminent threat of U.S.-led military action against Iraq.[40] 

Political parties have been legal in Jordan since 1992, and with the limited requirement of having only 50 initial members to register a party, many of them have formed around personalities and populist agendas rather than ideological or political platforms.[41]  The lack of strict procedures relating to the establishment of a political party, while perhaps viewed as democratic in that it places minimal restrictions on party formation, can actually serve to factionalize voters, thus favoring those parties that are better able to organize.[42]  In the case of Jordan, with so many restrictions placed on assembly for political or other means, this has effectively been to the advantage of the pro-regime parties because they are not subject to the same level of oversight and suppression as some of the more extreme parties.

Due to their weaknesses, candidates do not often rely on parties and instead seek their support bases through tribal and local loyalties.  In the 1997 – 2001 Parliament, 43 of the 80 members were tribal representatives not necessarily affiliated with political parties.[43]

The distribution of electoral seats in the Chamber of Deputies has favored pro-regime constituencies; areas identified as strong regime supporters, including rural and southern districts where many of the Bedouin tribes live, have received a disproportionate allocation of seats.  In an attempt to weaken the Islamic groups, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, the electoral law was amended in 1993 under King Hussein from a block-voting system to a one-person, one-vote system.  Despite divisions within the Islamic groups, they have managed to maintain representation in the parliament.[44]

To facilitate greater representation by pro-regime constituencies, the size of the parliament was increased from 80 to 110 seats, with the greatest increase going to the southern and western regions where support for the regime is highest.  This has led to a high level of under-representation of the Palestinian population; for example, a report by the Jordan Society for Citizens’ Rights demonstrates that Amman has approximately one parliament member for every 53,255 voters, while the city of Karak, hometown of the government’s interior minister, has one parliament member for every 6,000 voters.

The US-Jordan Connection

The United States has played a pivotal role in shaping Jordan’s policies, particularly as they relate to Israel and the peace process.  The strengthening of ties between Jordan and the United States has been met with resistance domestically, as well as from neighboring Arab states that feel Jordan is too permissive of U.S. and Israeli occupation of the West Bank.  Currently, Jordan receives $1 billion in aid from the United States through a variety of aid packages, clearly linking its support of the United States to its economic stability.[45]  Jordanian integration with the Israeli economy has further precipitated policies less hostile to Israel; the Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs) agreement maintains the status of the QIZs in Jordan, where a number of Israeli firms have set up enterprises within the export-orientated textile industry.  The agreement also provides for free trade of some goods across the Jordanian-Israeli border.[46]  While economic development can serve as a stabilizing and legitimizing source for the regime, the identity politics of a major population group within Jordan, the Palestinians, has incited resentment over the close economic connections between Jordan and both Israel and the US.

The U.S.-sponsored war in Iraq, designed to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime, was formally supported by Jordan but received much resistance from most of the Jordanian populace.  In a marked shift from admonition of the first Gulf War, King Abdullah has been a strong supporter of the new U.S.-backed Iraqi interim government. He has sent police and military instructors to help with the training of the new Iraqi police force and the military and has been a strong supporter of the war on terrorism - particularly following the bombing of the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad in August 2003 by a group allegedly linked to al-Qaeda.[47]

As leaders from various political parties in Jordan noted, the rise in public opinion has reached an unprecedented state and support for Arab causes has challenged the unmitigated authority of the government.  The rise in public opinion has been accompanied by civil action in the form of a boycott of U.S. products and the unwillingness of Jordanian citizens to openly support measures assumed pro-United States.[48]  Having engaged in a peace agreement with Israel in 1994 and adopted the structural adjustment programs by the West, Jordanians have felt betrayed by the United States as a result their persistent and vocal support of Israel and the Iraqi regime change.

The Israeli occupation of the West Bank is, by a vast consensus, viewed as an unjustifiably hostile attack against the Palestinians and many are outraged by what is perceived as unconditional support by the United States for Israel.  The resurrection of the “Jordan Option” plan, wherein the West Bank would be ceded back to Jordan, has further spawned anxiety among traditional groups. These groups fear that Palestinian interests would supercede those of Jordan and would serve to fundamentally alter the identity of the Hashemite Kingdom.[49]  Jordan has been instrumental in negotiations during peace talks and has been utilized by the United States to present an Arab ally of support.  King Abdullah, however, has on occasion been humiliated by President Bush, particularly because of Bush’s support of Sharon and for plans of disengagement, as well as his lack of regard for the right of return for Palestinian refugees.  As Lynch explains, the identity consensus within Jordan is tenuously constructed upon the belief that Palestinians may one day return to their homeland.[50]

Jordan First

In an attempt to mobilize the country and elicit a sense of nationalism, King Abdullah has launched a campaign under the slogan of “Jordan First,” designed to place greater emphasis on economic development, modernization, and incremental political reform rather than external concerns, namely Palestine.  The phrase “Jordan First” appeared on bumper stickers, billboards, banners and posters. It was carefully chosen so that the underlying message was that if anyone expressed support for Palestinians or Iraqis, they were not “putting Jordan first.”[51]  This movement paralleled the “unpatriotic” identification that was afforded to those against the war in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and aimed to create a psychology of self-censoring in the face of a perceived national threat.

It was, furthermore, viewed as a means of establishing support for the structural adjustment programs as sacrifices became more palatable if one believed it was for the good of the nation. 

Conclusion: Challenges and Prospects for Democracy in Jordan

Faced with the similar challenges of a Palestinian uprising in the West Bank, domestic discontent, and economic discord, the markedly divergent responses by Kings Hussein and Abdullah reflect, to an extent, the level of popular support received by each.  Seeing the need to provide political spaces for the expression of frustration regarding these conditions, King Hussein engaged in liberalizing practices. He did so as a means of maintaining legitimacy and building support for unpopular positions regarding Israel and the implementation of IMF structural adjustment programs.  King Abdullah, on the other hand, has systematically dismantled many of the reforms and essentially injected an element of martial law into the country, enacting curfews, prohibiting demonstrations, and denying freedom of the press.  Perhaps his lack of an established record, having recently ascended to the throne, accounts for his inability to coalesce an effective base of support that could have weathered the trials with which his regime was confronted.  However, his policies more likely represent the desire to maintain strict ties with both the European Union and the United States, despite the negative domestic consequences which surely resulted.

The support that has been given to the United States, despite its unpopular positions on the war in Iraq and support of Israel, has been divisive for the Jordanian public, which has increasingly expressed anti-American sentiment manifested through means such as the boycotting of U.S. products.  The unremitting support offered to the United States and its role in the peace process have had a paradoxical impact on Jordan.  On the one hand, ties between Jordan and the United States have intensified since the Intifada that has aided in the economic recovery of Jordan.  This would seemingly lead to the ability of King Abdullah to lower the level of coercion exerted on society.  Yet, despite moderate economic gains, the very support of the United States has been a destabilizing force for the king.  Unless U.S. policy shifts towards a more balanced approach in addressing the Arab-Israeli conflict, or unless King Abdullah extends greater consideration for the necessity of political participation and inclusion of Jordan, domestic tensions will persist and King Abdullah’s constituency will remain tenuously supportive at best.

Democracy is more effectively measured along a continuum, rather than within the absolute context of either existing or not. The level and complexity of democracy achieved in the developing world should not necessarily be evaluated against that of a developed state, which itself is not always a paradigm of democracy.  There are more states in the Muslim world which claim to be democratic than Islamic, and while they may not be following the same democratizing path as Western states, the perception by individuals that their country is advancing towards liberalization is itself significant.  With that in mind, it is important to recognize that Jordan’s democracy has been presented with some key challenges.  Most notably, when confronted with economic hardship, King Abdullah has elected to pursue an authoritarian model of placing limits on civil and political freedoms to avert public demonstrations of regime dissatisfaction.  Additionally, the parliamentary elections that took place in 2003 were viewed by many as illegitimate in that the redistricting which occurred increased the representation of those districts which were pro-regime, at the expense of fair and equal representation.

Jordan’s experiment with democracy has been asymmetrically presented with more challenges than not; however, some promising indicators which portend a liberalizing trend include increasing political awareness in the country and overall economic improvement in the Middle East.  This has generated money coming into Jordan through remittance payments and investment.  Economic integration projects with Israel, while unpopular with the Palestinian population in Jordan, may further lead to long-term stability between the two countries.

While, comparatively, Jordan fares better than most of its neighbors, its process of democratization has been cyclical and incomplete.  Democratic institutions, such as civilian courts and the parliament, exist; however, these institutions do not necessarily engender democracy.  If King Abdullah continues to exert authoritarian control over the democratic processes through the dissolution of parliament and the silencing of critics, the press, and political parties, it will only serve to undermine the dramatic reforms adopted under King Hussein and derail an experiment which has the potential to serve as a model to the rest of the Middle East.

Endnotes

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